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WHY SPARKY CAN'T BARK - A STUDY OF THE BAN
ON BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS FOR LOTTERIES
John Crigler, John Wells King and Amelia L. Brown*
Section 1304 of the U.S. Criminal Code prohibits
the broadcast of any "advertisement of or any infor-
mation concerning any lottery."1 The law that has
developed under the statute falls into one of two
completely different contexts. One context-that of
regulatory enforcement-is circumscribed, literalis-
tic, and punitive. It is concerned with forbidden
words and phrases, concrete factual contexts, strict
linguistic constructions, and the assessment of mone-
tary forfeitures. The other context-that of judicial
challenges to the constitutional validity of the adver-
tising ban-is expansive, abstract and theoretical. It
is concerned with general principles of First Amend-
ment law, the relationship between state and federal
policies, and questions of degree, such as the "sub-
stantiality" of government interests and the appro-
priateness of restrictions on protected speech. This
Article is an attempt to bring these two contexts to-
gether, to set them in a broader historical perspec-
tive, and to examine critically the issues now under
* John Crigler and John Wells King are partners, and
Amelia L. Brown is an associate, in the law firm of Haley,
Bader & Potts. The firm filed an amicus brief in Valley Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, No. 93-16191 (9th Cir. 1993), in
support of the challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1304.
1 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), amended by
the Charity Games Advertising Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
625, § 3(a)(4), 102 Stat. 3206 (1988). The statute provides:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television
station for which a license is required by any law of the
United States, or whoever, operating any such station,
knowingly permits the broadcasting of any advertisement
of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise or
similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in
part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or
awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise or
scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such
prizes, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both. Each day's broadcasting
shall constitute a separate offense.
Id.
, Id. The Supreme Court defined "lottery," for purposes of
section 1304, as "a scheme in which tickets are sold and prizes
are awarded among the ticket holders by lot." FCC v. American
consideration in the pending challenge to the adver-
tising ban.
I. THE FCC'S ENFORCEMENT OF 18 U.S.C.
§ 1304
The Bonanza Casino in Reno, Nevada, sponsored
a series of advertisements featuring canine mascots
Reno and son Sparky. Unlike other commercial mas-
cots, Reno and Sparky did not advertise their
master's principal line of business. They promoted
everything but gambling: the casino's food service, its
friendly atmosphere, its location and the adjoining
hotel.
The dogs were muzzled by the federal statute that
prohibits the broadcast on U.S. radio and television
of any information about "any lottery, gift enter-
prise, or similar scheme."" The Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("FCC" or "Commission"),
which enforces compliance with the law,8 has inter-
Broadcasting Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284, 290 n.8 (1954) (citing
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880)). The Court later dis-
tinguished a "gift enterprise" as a scheme that involves "the
purchase of merchandise or other property; the purchaser re-
ceives, in addition to the merchandise or other property, a 'free'
chance in a drawing." Id. (citing Homer v. United States, 147
U.S. 449 (1893)).
8 Implementing the statute, section 73.1211 of the FCC's
regulations provides:
(a) No licensee of an AM, FM or television broadcast
station, except as in paragraph (c) of this section, shall
broadcast any advertisement of or information concerning
any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering
prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance,
or any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of
any such lottery, gift enterprise or scheme, whether said
list contains any part or all of such prizes (18 U.S.C.
§ 1304, 62 Stat. 763).
(b) The determination whether a particular program
comes within the provisions of paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion depends on the facts of each case. However, the Com-
mission will in any event consider that a program comes
within the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section if in
connection with such program a prize consisting of money
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preted the term "lottery" to include casino gam-
bling." The FCC reasoned that "gaming activities of
gambling casinos contain the" three elements of a lot-
tery; that is, prize, consideration and chance."'
The Commission has acknowledged that the
meanings of "gambling activities" and "lotteries"
may differ. For example, although pari-mutuel bet-
ting on horse racing is a gambling activity, the FCC
does not treat it as a lottery because it presumes that
the element of chance is not present."
The FCC's strict interpretation of what comprises
"information about" a lottery is reflected in a series
of orders, public notices, and declaratory rulings,
many of which are unpublished letters.7 They chal-
lenge the promotional ingenuity of those to whom
the anti-lottery statute is directed. The Commission's
stance on the use of the word "casino" in commercial
or other thing of value is awarded to any person whose
selection is dependent in whole or in part upon lot or
chance, if as a condition of winning or competing for such
prize, such winner or winners are required to furnish any
money or other thing of value or are required to have in
their possession any product sold, manufactured, fur-
nished or distributed by a sponsor of a program broadcast
on the station in question (See 21 F.C.C.2d 846 (1970)).
(c) The provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion shall not apply to an advertisement, list of prizes or
other information concerning:
(1) A lottery conducted by a State acting under the au-
thority of State law which is broadcast by a radio or tele-
vision station licensed to a location in that State or any
other State which conducts such a lottery. (18 U.S.C.
§ 1307(a); 102 Stat. 3205).
(2) Fishing contests exempted under 18 U.S. Code 1305
(not conducted for profit, i.e., all receipts fully consumed
in defraying the actual costs of operation).
(3) Any gaming conducted by an Indian Tribe pursu-
ant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C.
§ 2701 et seq).
(4) A lottery, gift enterprise or similar scheme, other
than one described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, that
is authorized or not otherwise prohibited by the State in
which it is conducted and which is:
(i) Conducted by a not-for-profit organization or a gov-
ernmental organization (18 U.S.C § 1307(a); 102 Stat.
3205); or
(ii) Conducted as a promotional activity by a commer-
cial organization and is clearly occasional and ancillary to
the primary business of that organization (18 U.S.C.
§ 1307(a); 102 Stat. 3205).
(d)(1) For purposes of paragraph (c) of this section,
"lottery" means the pooling of proceeds derived from the
sale of tickets or chances and allotting those proceeds or
parts thereof by chance to one or more chance takers or
ticket purchasers. It does not include the placing or ac-
cepting of bets or wagers on sporting events or contests.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (c)(4)(i) of this section,
the term "not-for-profit organization" means any organi-
advertisements is illustrative. The FCC has con-
demned the utterance of "casino" as a generic noun,
such as "[t]his is what you've been waiting for: a ho-
tel/casino that loves to party,"8 or -as an adjective,
such as "Sam's Town has two floors of casino excite-
ment."9 In one creative commercial, the forbidden
word was reflected in the casino's swimming pool as
an announcer says "come play on the island."10 The
FCC concluded that the juxtaposition of the .video
and audio portions of the commercial created an
"overall impression" that the advertisement promotes
the gambling activities of the casino."
In Reno and Sparky's case, the offending word
"casino" appeared on screen for a few seconds, in a
context entirely incidental to the main thrust of the
commercial.' Sparky and Reno were filmed in the
front seat of a red Cadillac used by the casinos for
zation that would qualify as tax exempt under section 501
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
47 C.F.R. § 73.1211 (1992). A similar regulation applies to
origination cablecasting by cable television systems. 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.213 (1992). "Origination cablecasting" is programming
that is subject to the exclusive control of a cable operator, 47
C.F.R. § 76.5(P) (1992), as distinguished from programming
originated on public, governmental, and educational access chan-
nels. The FCC staff holds the view that the lottery ban applies
to origination cablecasting, but does not apply to material car-
ried on leased public access channels. Letter from Edythe Wise,
Chief, Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enf. Div., MM,
FCC, to Joel K. Schwartz, Regional Manager, Cable Ad Net
(Feb. 25, 1987) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus). A cable
operator is prohibited from exercising control over such chan-
nels. 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (1988).
' Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investi-
gations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC, to Alan Campbell, Dow,
Lohnes & Albertson (Sept. 18, 1985) (on file with CommLaw
Conspectus) [hereinafter Letter from Edythe Wise to Alan
Campbell].
Id.
Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investi-
gations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC, to Robert J. Robinson,
Administrator, State of Montana Dept. of Justice, Gambling
Control Division (Aug. 16, 1992) (on file with CommLaw
Conspectus).
See, e.g., infra notes 8-11.
Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to Calnevar
Broadcasting, Inc., 8 FCC Rcd. 32 (1992).
9 Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to Channel 33,
Inc., 7 FCC Rcd. 3224 (1992) [hereinafter Letter from Roy J.
Stewart to Channel 33].
,0 Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investi-
gations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC to J. Dominic Monahan,
(Apr. 21, 1986) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus) [hereinaf-
ter Letter from Edythe Wise to J. Dominic Monahan].
I ld.
" Here is a transcript of one of the Bonanza Casino adver-
tisements, entitled "Rodeo Cowboys":
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promotional appearances at parades and at rodeos.
On the side of the car were painted the words, "Bo-
nanza Casino, Live Entertainment - 4720 N. Vir-
ginia St. - The Friendliest Casino in Reno, NV."
The second occurrence of the word "casino" resulted
in the assessment of a $12,500 forfeiture."
The FCC, however, does not forbid use of the
word "casino" when used as the proper name of the
commercial sponsor. The Commission reasons that
"[tlhe word 'casino' is promotional of a lottery and
may be used in a broadcast only when the word is
part of a legal name of a multi-purpose
establishment."
1 4
The "multi-purpose establishment" criterion
sprang from the FCC's observation that unless a ca-
sino has bona fide non-gaming activities to advertise,
any advertisement would directly promote a lot-
tery.15 The FCC went on to express concern that
promotion of a casino's non-gaming activities "not be
used as a sham to promote the gaming activities,"16
and obliquely offered a standard of proof to establish
the legitimacy of a casino's restaurant operations:
[Aidvertisers or their counsel have occasionally furnished
information concerning, for example: (1) annual restau-
rant revenues; (2) square footage; (3) design and location
of the restaurant (i.e., whether it is located on the same
premises and has a separate entrance from that of the ca-
sino); and (4) whether the restaurant is a full service one
serving three meals daily and is patronized primarily for
its own sake rather than as a fast food bar to support the
gaming patrons."
The FCC also has focused on other elements that
in its view promote a lottery. The most obvious of
these is gambling paraphernalia." To state that a
commercial sponsor has "lots of liberal slots" violates
the anti-lottery statute.1 9 Even a commercial set in
an elevator can violate the statute: "visual and audio
effects created by the bells, pinball-like lights in the
elevator and sounds that are not dissimilar from that
of mechanical and electronic slot machines, enhance
the impression created by the dialogue [that one
could easily win at gambling there]."20
Display of gambling paraphernalia, such as play-
ing cards, a roulette wheel, and a craps table, are
not, by themselves, offensive when used in a televi-
sion game show. However, a program producer who
proposed to employ such items in a Las Vegas set-
VIDEO:
Super over scene of six cowboys
sitting in front of stables:
"Meanwhile back at the ranch . .
Cut to red Cadillac convertible
driving by, beeping horn, Reno at
the wheel with two cowboys in front
and three sitting on top of rear seat,
tipping hats and waving. Lettering
on side of car: "Bonanza Casino.
Live Entertainment 4720 N.
Virginia St. . . . The Friendliest




You know, I remember
the first time Reno
and I went to the
Bonanza to eat.
You know he put
away three of them
$3.99 rib dinners and




You know, I've never
seen a dog ride a horse
any better.
Cowboy #3:
Yep, I hear he's going
to be in the rodeo
parade again this year.
Cowboy #4:
Who was that masked
dog?
Cut to stables Scene
Slide: "Bonanza Casino
4720 N. Virginia St.
-Reno-"
Cowboy #5:







' Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to DR Partners,
Licensee, KOLO-TV, 8 FCC Rcd. 44 (1992). -
", Id. "If the word 'Casino' is not part of the~proper name of
a resort, depicting that word in the commercial would be an im-
proper promotion of a lottery .... ." Letter from Edythe Wise,
Chief, Complaints and Investigations Branch, Enf. Div., MM,
FCC, to Rolla Cleaver, Esq., Vice President and General Coun-
sel, Valley Broadcasting Co. (July 31, 1990) (on file with
CommLaw Conspectus).
" Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investi-
gations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC, to J. Dominic Monahan,
(July 21, 1987) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus) [hereinaf-




's Letter from Roy J. Stewart to Channel 33, supra note 9.




ting was informed that their use would run afoul of
the anti-lottery statute."1 The FCC observed:
[Tihe TV program will be taped live with an audience
from a showroom or ballroom of a Las Vegas hotel/casino
and the opening of the program will feature that location
with words such as "From the beautiful - hotel
and casino in Las Vegas, Nevada, it's time to play (title of
show)."'"
The FCC ruled that to connect the program with
"any identifiable Las Vegas hotel/casino would be
promoting the lotteries at those establishments" in
violation of the Commission's rules and the anti-lot-
tery statute." Similarly, a proposed program called
"Casino Line," designed to educate the viewer on
the "theory, objectives, rules, and odds inherent in
various popular gambling games such as blackjack,
roulette, and craps," would, in the FCC's view, vio-
late the anti-lottery statute if one of the hosts of the
program "is simultaneously employed by a legal
gambling enterprise (casino) ...to the degree that
the second host's association with the casino is iden-
tifiable.""' As to sponsorship of such a program, the
FCC concluded:
[S]ponsorship in whole or in part through spot advertising
by casino hotels or convention and visitor bureaus that are
normally underwritten by the local casino hotels would
raise a question whether the program is merely an at-
tempt to advertise and/or promote the casino gaming ac-
tivities of the sponsoring or associate casinos. 5
In the FOC's view, the lottery prohibition extends
to the slightest impression that broadcast material
promotes a particular lottery. Slogans, descriptive
phrases, and song lyrics that are susceptible of a
gambling interpretation are forbidden. Thus, the
FCC held that even though "play the favorite" is
susceptible of an innocent interpretation, it may
nonetheless promote lottery activity." Addressing the
licensee's contentions, the FCC found:
You state that the phrase, "The Palace Station, play the
favorite" does not refer to any particular gambling game
or to gambling in general, but, rather, to the fact that the
Palace Station won in ten different categories in the Las
", Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investi-
gations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC, to Kenneth Yates, Yates




"' Letter from Edythe Wise to Alan Campbell, supra note 4.
25 Id.
2' Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to Common-
wealth Broadcasting of Northern California (July 29, 1992) (on
Vegas Review Journal's poll, ranging from best seafood
restaurant to best slots. In the context of discussing the
poll to which you refer, the subject phrase could be inter-
preted as you say it should be. However, we find that the
phrase "The Palace Station, play the favorite," as broad-
cast in the subject commercial, promotes ongoing lottery
activities at the Palace Station, despite your explanation.'
7
Activity that is described as "Vegas-style" is simi-
larly suspect. The FCC found that the phrase
"Vegas-style games" violates the statute.26 However,
"Vegas-style excitement" was found to be acceptable
in commercials for activities that either are not lot-
teries or are gambling activities authorized under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.29 The FCC rea-
soned: "In the context of a multi-use establishment,
the phrase 'Vegas-style excitement' can fairly be
taken as a comprehensive reference to the entertain-
ment, food and drink, decor, and other factors that
combine to create the ambiance popularly associated
with Las Vegas establishments."80
Even if forbidden words, phrases, slogans, and
song lyrics are not used in a casino advertisement,
the FCC has looked to the "underlying purpose" of
a commercial to determine whether a lottery promo-
tion is present. Commenting on a proposed adver-
tisement called "Tour Bus," the FCC ruled:
[I]t is clear from such visual scenes as the Dunes hotel
sign, the bus route sign ["8 STRIP"] and the sign con-
taining the numbers 77777, that the underlying purpose is
to promote a lottery. The bus does, in fact, arrive at the
Hilton where lottery activities are conducted. The dia-
logue adds further specific promotional value when it im-
plies that, at the Hilton, a person may easily win the cost
of a mobile home merely by stopping in. There is no men-
tion of other activities at the hotel to which the audio and
visual references may be reasonably related.81
The FCC functions as a kind of advertising re-
view board, which applies its own arcane code to lot-
tery ads, thus, advertisers like the Bonanza Casino
often produce commercials that discuss at length
such activities as food service, atmosphere and loca-
tion; and purely by inference, suggest that the same
qualities of service exist with respect to the casino's
unmentionable primary business.
file with CommLaw Conspectus), enforced, 8 FCC Rcd. 46
(1992).
27 Id.
'8 In re Liability of WTMJ, Inc., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 4354, para. 4 (1993).
" Id.; See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
80 Id.




II. HISTORY OF LOTTERY ADVERTISING
BAN AND EXCEPTIONS
A. The Rise of Lottery Regulation
Lotteries were not always so strictly regulated.
The first lotteries in the United States were author-
ized by the British Crown as early as 1612, when
the Virginia Company of London was granted per-
mission to conduct lotteries in the colonies. 2 The
Virginia lottery was considered respectable-"two of
the eight prizes [awarded] were won by church
parishes.""3
Thomas Jefferson sought permission from the
Virginia statehouse to operate a lottery in order to
raise funds to retire his debts.34 "State conducted lot-
teries prospered into the early years of the nine-
teenth century and played an important role in the
westward expansion of the nation."3" Not only were
lotteries authorized to benefit insolvent debtors, but
lotteries also funded "all types of public works which
in later years would be financed by taxes or bond
issues.""
By the mid 1800s, when approximately $66.4 mil-
lion in lottery revenue was being raised annually by
the eastern states, it was clear that lotteries could be
a major source of revenue for all the states.3" In
1812, congressional legislation authorized lotteries
00 See Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social
Costs: A Historical Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling,
34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 25 & n.77 (1992) (discussing Virginia
Charter of 1612, § XVI) reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND Docu-
MENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 37, 44 (W. Swin-
dler ed., 1979).
00 John Steele Gordon, Born of Iniquity, Running the Long
Lived Louisiana Lottery Was as Certain a Moneymaker as
Owning the Mint, AMERICAN HERITAGE MAGAZINE, Feb.-
Mar. 1994, at 14.
" Rychlak, supra note 32, at 30-31 n.124.
85 Id. at 31.
s Id.
37 See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSIS-
TANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING: 1776 TO 1976, at 655-70
(1977).
so See G. Robert Blakey and Harold A. Kurland, The De-
velopment of the Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L.
REV. 923, 927-928 n.12 (1978) (referring to Act of May 4,
1812, ch. 75, § 6, 2 Stat. 721 (1812)).
00 See generally Rychlak, supra note 32, at 11-16.
40 See Blakey, supra note 38, at 927. See also Gordon, supra
note 33, at 14. "As early as 1812 Massachusetts authorized a
lottery to raise $16,000 to repair Plymouth Beach. Nine years
later, although 111,800 tickets had been sold and $886,439 had
been raised, only $9,876 had been turned over to repair the
beach. The rest had just melted away like a wave on the sand."
for the District of Columbia.8 Generally speaking,
these state lotteries operated as state-sponsored lot-
teries operate today: tickets were sold, money col-
lected, and prize winners were selected by chance.
The collected money funded the prize, the adminis-
trative costs of operating the lottery, and the cause
for which the lottery was held. 9
These highly successful lotteries were not without
scandal 0 or social repercussions.41 In response to
this perception of widespread corruption, Congress
limited the use of the mails for lottery purposes and
in 1827 passed legislation forbidding postmasters or
assistant postmasters from acting as agents for lottery
offices or vending lottery tickets.42 In addition, most
states acted to make lotteries illegal.43 In fact, by the
time the Civil War began, Missouri and Kentucky
alone had legal lotteries.4 4 Soon after the war ended
and while Louisiana was still under federal control,
the state legislature established a new lottery as one
writer described as "born of iniquity."4 5 By 1878,
Louisiana remained the only state authorizing a
lottery. 46
In 1868, Congress passed a law making it unlaw-
ful to "deposit in any post office, to be sent by mail,
any letters or circulars concerning lotteries, so-called
gift concerts, or other similar enterprises offering
Id.
41 The Librarian of Congress wrote in 1893 that public sen-
timent viewed lotteries as "among the most dangerous and pro-
lific sources of human misery." A.R. Spofford, Lotteries in
American History, S. MIsc. DOC. No. 57, 52d Cong., 2d Sess.
195 (1893).
"' Act of March 2, 1827, ch. 61., § 6, 19th Cong., Sess. II, 4
Stat. 238, 239 (1827) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1303
(1988)).
43 Rychlak, supra note 32, at 37 n.163, referring to the fol-
lowing as examples of state laws: (1) Act of June 14, 1832, 1832
MICH. TERR. LAWS 15 (outlawing sale or advertising of private
lottery tickets); (2) MINN. TERR. REV. STAT., ch. 105, §§ 1-2
(1851) (prohibiting lotteries); (3) Act of Apr. 30, 1833, ch. 306,
1833 N.Y. LAWS 484 (similar); (4) Act of Dec. 23, 1830, GA.
LAWS 201 (taxing lotteries); (5) Act of Feb. 26, 1835, 1834 Mo.
LAWS 56 (requiring bond of lottery managers for previously au-
thorized lotteries).
44 Gordon, supra note 33, at 14.
45 Id.
46 Rychlak, supra note 32, at 40. Louisiana chartered its lot-
tery in 1868 for a twenty-five year term and reportedly the lot-
tery paid out more than $3 million per year during its heyday.
Id. at 40-41. The Louisiana lottery was "required to make an
annual forty-thousand dollar payment to the Charity Hospital of
New Orleans, but was not otherwise taxed by the State."
Gordon, supra note 33, at 14-16. The lottery operators report-
edly were very generous to victims of disaster (e.g., floods and
epidemics) as well. Id. at 16.
19941
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prizes of any kind on any pretext whatsoever. '4 7
When the postal laws were codified in 1872, the ban
against mailing lottery information was amended to
apply only to illegal lotteries.48 This revised statute
kept in place the ban on postal officials' acting as
agents for lotteries.' 9
The ban instituted in 1872 was limited to illegal
lotteries, thus, it did little to control state-sanctioned
lotteries. In 1876, Congress again amended the mail
statute. By deleting the word "illegal" from section
3894 of the revised statute, Congress made it a crime
to deposit any letters or circulars concerning lotteries
in the mail, regardless of the legality of the lottery.50
The prohibition on mailing lottery information
was challenged and upheld in Ex Parte Jackson,"' in
which one Ireland Jackson was tried and convicted
for mailing a circular concerning a lottery. The Su-
preme Court upheld the conviction and found the
statute to be constitutional on the grounds that "[t]he
power possessed by Congress embraces the regula-
tion of the entire postal system of the country. The
right to designate what shall be carried necessarily
involves the right to determine what shall be ex-
cluded."'" The Court noted, however, that "the ob-
ject of Congress has not been to interfere with free-
dom of the press, or with any other rights of the
people; but to refuse its facilities for the distribution
of matter deemed injurious to the public morals."5"
The Court reasoned that Congres merely was ex-
tending to circulars containing lotteries the same
I
Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 40th Cong., Sess II,
15 Stat. 196 (1868).
,' Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335., 17 Stat. 283, 302 (1872)
(Rev. Stat. Sec. 3894) (an act to revise, consolidate and amend
the statutes relating to the post-office department).
Section 149 provided, in relevant part, "[tihat it shall not be
lawful to convey by mail, nor to deposit in a post-office to be
sent by mail, any letters or circulars concerning illegal lotteries,
so-called gift-concerts, or other similar enterprises offering
prizes, or concerning schemes devised and intended to deceive
and defraud the public for the purposes of obtaining money
under false pretenses . . . ." [sic] Id.
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 79, 17 Stat. 283, 294
(1872).
" Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, § 2, 19 Stat. 90 (1876)
(codified at REV. STAT. § 3894) (2d ed. 1878).
51 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
82 Id. at 732.
58 Id. at 736.
a4 Id.
'6 See 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 306, 309 (1885).
Id.
57 21 CONG. REC. 8705-06 (1890) (Remarks of Rep.
Moore).
" Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, ch. 908, § 3894, 26 Stat. 465
(1890) (codified at REV. STAT. § 3894, (Supp. 2d ed. 1891) (to
treatment extended to publications containing lewd
or obscene materials. 4
Even with the ban on mailing lottery information,
a loophole remained: advertisements of lotteries in
newspapers. The U.S. Attorney General determined
that because newspapers were not circulars, they
were outside of the ban's reach. 5 "I do not think
that a newspaper or periodical is rendered non-mail-
able by containing a lottery advertisement. This does
not transform the newspaper into a 'circular' within
the meaning" of the law, wrote Attorney General
Augustus H. Garland in 1885.5" The Louisiana lot-
tery used the loophole for newspapers to reach citi-
zens throughout the country. Ninety-three percent of
the lottery's income reportedly came from people liv-
ing outside of Louisiana.57
With the Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, Congress
closed this loophole by banning from the mail news-
papers containing lottery advertisements. 8 The ban
was challenged in Ex Parte Rapier.59 Rapier, presi-
dent and general manager of the Mobile Daily and
Weekly Register in Alabama, was charged with vio-
lating U.S. Postal laws by publishing an advertise-
ment for the Louisiana State Lottery Company in a
newspaper deposited in the U.S. mail.80 In a similar
petition, decided by the Court at the same time, a
Mr. Dupre was indicted in February 1891, for mail-
ing a newspaper containing an advertisement for a
lottery.61
The convictions of both men were upheld by the
amend certain sections of the revised statutes relating to lotter-
ies)). Section 3894 provided in relevant part:
No letter, postal card, or circular concerning any lottery,
so-called gift concert, or other similar enterprise offering
prizes dependent upon lot or chance, or concerning
schemes devised for the purpose of obtaining money or
property under false pretenses, and no list of the drawings
at any lottery or similar scheme, and no lottery ticket or
part thereof, and no check, draft, bill, money, postal note,
or money-order for the purchase of any ticket, tickets, or
part thereof, or of any share or any chance in any such
lottery or gift enterprise, shall be carried in the mail or
delivered at or through any post-office or branch thereof,
or by any letter carrier; nor shall any newspaper, circular,
pamphlet, or publication of any kind containing any ad-
vertisement of any lottery of gift enterprise of any kind
offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance, or contain-
ing any list of prizes awarded at the drawings of any such
lottery or gift enterprise, whether said list is of any part
or of all of the drawing, be carried in the mail or deliv-
ered by any postmaster or letter-carrier.
Id.





Supreme Court, which found the earlier Jackson de-
cision controlling:
It is not necessary that Congress should have the power to
deal with crime or immorality within the states in order to
maintain that it possesses the power to forbid the use of
the mails in aid of the perpetration of crime and immoral-
ity .... We cannot regard the right to operate a lottery as
a fundamental right infringed by the legislation in ques-
tion; nor are we able to see that Congress can be held, in
its enactment, to have abridged the freedom of the press.
The circulation of newspapers is not prohibited, but the
government declines itself to become an agent in the circu-
lation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to
the people.6"
Virtually foreclosed from advertising its lottery in
the U.S. and having lost its state charter, the pri-
vately-operated, state-sanctioned Louisiana lottery
moved its operation to Honduras." But the
"Serpent," as the Louisiana lottery came to be
called, survived." ' In response, Congress in 1895
banned the transportation of lottery-related materi-
als, including tickets, in interstate and foreign com-
merce. 5 Section 4 of the statute gave postal workers
the authority to refuse to deliver any mail relating
to, or believed to relate to, lotteries." In 1890, postal
officials had been given the same authority with re-
gard to registered mail, and were allowed to return
to senders any registered mail sent to persons be-
lieved to be operating a lottery.
6 7
The first challenge to the 1895 law to reach the
Supreme Court was France v. United States."8 Mes-
sengers for a Kentucky-based lottery who solicited
bets in Ohio returned to Kentucky with papers con-
taining the selected numbers, and then returned to
Ohio after the drawing each day with payoffs to the
winners and lists of winning numbers. The messen-
63 Id. at 134.
63 Blakey, supra note 38, at 941.
" Id. at 935.
66 Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 1, 53d Cong., Sess. III,
28 Stat. 963 (1895), U.S. COMP. STAT. 1901, 3178 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1301) (suppression of lottery traffic
through national and interstate commerce). Section 1 of the Act
stated, in relevant part:
That any person who shall cause to be brought within the
United States from abroad, for the purpose of disposing of
the same, or deposited in or carried by the mails of the
United States, or carried from one state to another in the
United States, any paper, certificate, or instrument pur-
porting to be or represent a ticket, chance, share, or inter-
est in or dependent upon the event of a lottery ... or shall
cause any advertisment of such lottery ... to be brought
into the United States, or deposited in or carried by the
mails of the United States, or transferred from one state to
another in the same, shall be punishable in the first of-
gers were arrested by federal agents as they returned
to Ohio and charged with violating the lottery ban. 9
In a narrow holding, the Supreme Court upheld the
statute but found the defendants not guilty. The ban
was construed as prospective in nature. It did not
prohibit the transportation of materials relating to a
drawing that had already taken place. "The lottery
had already been drawn; the papers carried by the
messengers were not then dependent upon the event
of any lottery ... .70
In a more celebrated case, Champion v. Ames,
71
the 1895 Act was challenged as exceeding Congress's
Commerce Clause power. The Court again upheld
the constitutionality of the statute.72 Champion was
charged with engaging in a conspiracy to ship lottery
tickets from Texas to California for the monthly
drawing of the Pan-American Lottery Company,
based in Paraguay. 8 Champion claimed that the
carrying of the tickets, which had no real or substan-
tial value in. and of themselves, was not commerce
among the states, and that Congress had no author-
ity to regulate such activity.
74
After determining that there was value to lottery
tickets in that carrying them from state to state con-
stitutes commerce, and that the statute addressed and
banned this conduct, the Court was faced with the
question of whether an outright prohibition on ship-
ping lottery tickets could be deemed regulation of in-
terstate commerce. In upholding the prohibition as a
valid form of regulation, the Court referred to a case
decided several years earlier, in which the Court had
observed that the "suppression of nuisances injurious
to public health or morality is among the most im-
portant duties of government.
' '7
5
Experience has shown that the common forms of gam-
fense by imprisonment for not more than two years or by
a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or both, and
in the second and after offenses by such imprisonment
only.
Id. § 1.
" Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 4, 53d Cong., Sess. III,
28 Stat. 963 (1895) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1301
(1988)).
67 Blakey, supra note 38, at 935 n.45 (citation omitted), 939
n.57 (citing Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 2, 26 Stat. 465
(1890)).
164 U.S. 676 (1897).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 682.
71 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
72 Id.
7' Id. at 323.
74 Id. at 353.
75 Id. at 356.
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bling are comparatively innocuous when placed in con-
trast with the widespread pestilence of lotteries. The for-
mer are confined to a few persons and places, but the
latter infests the whole community; it enters every dwell-
ing; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings
of the poor; it plunders the ignorant and simple."
The Court reiterated that Congress's power to
regulate commerce is bound only by limitations con-
tained in the Constitution, and noted that Congress
was not seeking to legislate the internal affairs of a
state, but commerce among the several states.
As a state may, for the purpose of guarding the morals of
its own people, forbid all sales of lottery tickets within its
limits, so Congress, for the purpose of guarding the people
of the United States against the 'widespread pestilence of
lotteries' and to protect the commerce which concerns all
the states, may prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from
one state to another.
77
In Francis v. United States,7 a case decided con-
currently with Champion, the Court reversed a
criminal conviction by narrowly construing the stat-
ute. In Francis, an Ohio lottery operator was con-
victed of conspiracy in connection with transporting
betting slips and other lottery related materials from
Kentucky to Ohio, in violation of Rev. Stat.
§ 5440.79 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes
said that the transportation involved was not the
same as mail, and did not constitute commerce be-
cause the betting slips passed from agent to agent,
but remained within the company's possession at all
times. Furthermore, the Court held that the agents'
records of what numbers bettors had chosen did not
"represent" the purchasers' chances of winning.80
Federal regulation of lotteries and the dissemina-
tion of lottery information thus stood firmly on the
Commerce Clause by the dawn of commercial radio
broadcasting early in the twentieth century. Neither
78 Id. at 356 (citing Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 163, 168
(1850), 12 L.Ed. 1030 (1850)).
7 Id. at 357.
78 188 U.S. 375 (1903).
79 Id. at 375-76 (citing Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 191, 28
Stat. 963).
8 Id. at 377, see also Blakey, supra note 38, at 944-45.
• Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912), repealed
by, Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 39, 44 Stat. 1162, 1174
(1927).
"' Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), re-
pealed by, Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48
Stat. 1064, 1102 (1934).
88 ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
MASS MEDIA & DEMOCRACY, THE BATTLE FOR THE CON-
TROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935, at 13 (1993).
" Id. at 14.
the Radio Act of 1912,1 nor the Radio Act of
1927,2 addressed lottery advertising. The 1912 Act
was "passed to coordinate point-to-point communi-
cation and did not anticipate the emergence of broad-
casting.""6 It was unclear for some time whether a
viable broadcast industry would emerge. "There was
little sense that broadcasting could be profitable
throughout the 1920s.""4 Even if a viable industry
emerged, it was unclear how it would be financed.6
In fact, a contest was conducted by a trade publica-
tion in 1925 to determine the best method of sup-
porting broadcasting. 6 AT&T's system of "toll"
broadcasting drew mixed results. Although its New
York station, WEAF, was "the first station to regu-
larly sell airtime to commercial interests," AT&T
solicited listeners for direct donations in 1924.87 Not
until the early 1930s was it generally agreed that ad-
vertising would be the best way to finance the
industry. 6
Once it became clear that advertising would pro-
vide the financial support for the powerful new me-
dium, lottery control provisions began to appear.
The radio industry adopted a Code of Fair Competi-
tion, which provided:
[N]o broadcaster or network shall knowingly permit the
broadcasting of, or information concerning any lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in
whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the
prizes drawn or awarded by means of such lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme whether said list contains any part
or all of such prizes.8"
The voluntary Code may have been an attempt to
head off the extension of the postal ban to radio ad-
vertising. It did not succeed. Broadcast of lottery in-
formation was forbidden by section 316 of the Com-
munications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act").90 The
principal argument made in favor of including the
89 See WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW, § 32c
(1948). See generally, BARNOUW, THE SPONSER, NOTES ON A
MODERN POTENTATE (1977).
" McChesney, supra note 83, at 15.
87 Id. at 12-13, 15.
" Id. at 17, referring to Eric Barnouw. McChesney points
out that the debate over how the broadcast industry would be
financed raged for years before any decision was ultimately
made. He notes that not even Congress addressed the question of
whether the U.S. should have a "nationwide broadcasting system
financed by advertising." Id. His book provides an excellent dis-
cussion on the subject.
0 See Haley, The Broadcasting and Postal Lottery Statutes,
4 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, n.1 (1936) (referring to the Code of
Fair Competition, Art. VII, § 4(e), approved by President
Roosevelt on Nov. 27, 1933, Registry No. 1742-09).
90 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 316, 48 Stat.
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advertising ban in the 1934 Act, that broadcasters
should be subject to the same prohibitions as news-
papers and should not be given an unfair advantage
over the print medium, was stated in committee
hearings leading to the Act's passage:
[T]he Committee does not think that the United States
should permit any radio station, licensed and regulated by
the Government, to engage in such unlawful practices.
Furthermore, the broadcast of such unlawful information
is unfair to the newspapers, which are forbidden to use
the mails, if they contain such information. 1
Although 18 U.S.C. § 1304 is a criminal statute,
no prosecution has been brought under this law."
The statute has been enforced solely through the
FCC's administrative processes.98
B. The Return of State-Conducted Lotteries
For more than a quarter century, the advertising
ban contained in section 1304 remained in effect and
unchallenged. Then, the underlying framework be-
gan to give way. In 1963, New Hampshire became
the first state in modern times to institute a state-run
lottery."" By 1975, several states had begun operat-
ing lotteries to raise money for government pro-
grams. Their actions forced Congress to act in order
to head off a threatened prosecution of these states.9"
Congress chose to accommodate the operation of le-
gally authorized state-run lotteries consistent with
continued federal protection of the policies of non-
lottery states.9 6
In 1975, Congress modified the ban on lottery ad-
1064, 1088 (1934). Section 316 was codified in 1948 under Title
18 of the U.S. Code at section 1304. See Pub. L. No. 772, ch.
645, § 1304, 62 Stat. 862, 866 (1948). See also 1948
U.S.C.C.A.N. A325, A582. For language of section 1304, see
supra note 1. Although the ban contained in the 1934 Act re-
ferred only to radio transmissions, the FCC interpreted "radio"
generically to include television broadcasting as well. In addi-
tion, section 1304 was amended in 1988 to conform to the FCC's
interpretation and pertains to all radio transmissions, including
television. See Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 10-625, § 3(a)(4), 102 Stat. 3206 (1988).
Current sections 312(b) and 503 of the 1934 Act grant the FCC
authority to bring administrative actions, including cease and de-
sist orders, and forfeiture penalties, against persons who violate
18 U.S.C. § 1304. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(b), 503(b)(1), and
503(b)(2)(A) (1991).
91 S. REP. No. 1045 (which accompanied H.R. 7716), 72d
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1933).
" Blakey, supra note 38, at 946.
93 The FCC rule implementing section 1304 is found at 47
C.F.R. § 73.1211 (1992). See source cited supra note 3.
" Blakey, supra note 38, at 950 n.114, citing N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 284: 21-a to 21-t (1977).
vertisements to "permit the transportation, mailing,
and broadcasting of advertising, information, and
materials concerning lotteries authorized by law and
conducted by a state and for other purposes .... -17
Title 18 of the U.S. Code was amended to add sec-
tion 1307, which set forth exceptions to the bans
contained in sections 1301, 1302, 1303, and 1304."
Section 1307 permitted broadcasting by radio and
television of advertising, lists of prizes, or informa-
tion concerning a state-conducted lottery by a broad-
cast station licensed to a location in a state con-
ducting a lottery under authority of state law;
mailing of newspapers published in the state con-
taining advertisements or information for state-spon-
sored lotteries; and transporting or mailing tickets
and other materials concerning a state-conducted lot-
tery within the state to addresses within the state.99
The exemption for advertising state lotteries was
quickly exploited and state-conducted lotteries prolif-
erated. The institution of a lottery by the Common-
wealth of Virginia illustrates this pattern. As noted
by the Supreme Court, Virginia "entered the mar-
ketplace vigorously. 100 On November 3, 1987, the
Virginia electorate approved a referendum to estab-
lish a state-operated lottery, create a State Lottery
Board, and appropriate the necessary funds.'01 The
lottery law became effective on December 1, 1987.
Even before lottery tickets became available, a
commercial radio station in northern Virginia sought
FCC approval to begin broadcasting advertisements
and information pertaining to lotteries sponsored by
Maryland and the District of Columbia.'02 Section
1307(a)(1)(A)(ii) permits a station licensed to an ad-
95 Id. at 952 (citing Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
583, 88 Stat. 1916 (1974)).
" See generally, H.R. REP. No. 1517, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7007.
" Pub. L. No. 93-583, 88 Stat. 1916 (1975), H.R. REP. No.
1517, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7007.
98 Id.; Act of Oct. 17, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-525, 90 Stat.
2748 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. 3005 (d)). The 1975
law also amended 18 U.S.C. § 1953(b) to exempt materials re-
lated to state conducted lotteries from the prohibition against in-
terstate transportation of gambling paraphernalia. See Act of
Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-583, § 3, 88 Stat. 1916 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1953).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)-(d) (1988).
100 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,
2702 (1993). Virginia is authorized by law to sponsor a lottery,
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4001 (Michie 1987) and since 1988 has
conducted a series of lottery games.
10 See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-4001 (Michie 1987).
10o Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investi-
gations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, FCC, to Julian Shepard, Esq.,
(Dec. 28, 1987) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus).
19941
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
jacent state which conducts a lottery to broadcast ad-
vertisements for either state's lottery. Thus, the issue
before the FCC was whether passage of a law au-
thorizing a Virginia lottery was equivalent to "con-
ducting" a lottery. The FCC held that the enactment
of the law and the initial preparatory steps were in-
sufficient to permit a finding that Virginia was con-
ducting a lottery, where the appointees to the lottery
commission had not yet been sworn in and the com-
mission had not yet been staffed. The FCC informed
the station that when Virginia actually commenced
lottery ticket sales and the state lottery commission
was better organized and staffed, the Commission's
position or view might be different.1 08
Once under way, the Virginia lottery developed
quickly. Promotion of the lottery was assisted by
Virginia's own version of Reno and Sparky; "Lady
Luck," who quickly became a sort of "legend."' '
Lady Luck was a character garbed in a lacy, multi-
layered gown, covered with gold, silver, glitter and
sequins, and sceptered with a "star on a stick." She
appeared in a promotional calendar and in nine
commercials, and attracted enough of a following to
justify a "13-Day Lucky Tour," in which she made
local appearances throughout Virginia.
This local folk hero was at least partially respon-
103 Id.
104 See The Virginia Lottery Celebrates 5 Fabulous Years,
(The Virginia Lottery, 1993).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 5.
10 Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 732 F. Supp
633, 635 (E.D. Va. 1990), afl'd per curiam, 956 F.2d 263 (4th
Cir. 1992), rev'd, United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113
S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
lo Id.
LIo Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988)).
... The relevant provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 2703 are as
follows:
Definitions
(6) The term "class I gaming" means social games
solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of
Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or
in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.
(7)(A) The term "class II gaming" means-
(i) the game of chance commonly known as bingo
(whether or not electronic computer, or other technologic
aids are used in connection therewith)-
(I) which is played for prizes, including mone-
tary prizes, with cards bearing numbers or other
designations,
(II) in which the holder of the card covers such
numbers or designations when objects, similarly
numbered or designated, are drawn or electroni-
cally determined, and
sible for the fact that, in five years, the lottery has
"emerged as one of the leading lotteries in the na-
tion." 105 Since Virginia lottery tickets went on sale
September 20, 1988, players have purchased more
than 3.5 billion tickets and have won more than $1.7
billion in prizes.106 More than 5,600 retailers sell
Virginia lottery tickets. Licensed retailers include
convenience stores, service stations, supermarkets,
restaurants, and other retail outlets throughout the
state.10
7
The Virginia lottery is heavily advertised. "In
1988, the Commonwealth paid $1,285,141 in adver-
tising costs to the media. In 1989, the Virginia Lot-
tery Board estimated that those expenditures would
reach in that year $2.3 million . .. 2 0o' In 1989, the
Lottery Board was spending nearly half of its adver-
tising budget on television time.109
C. Additional Exemptions From the Ban
Two laws passed in 1988 expanded the exemption
from the advertising ban that had been granted to
state-conducted lotteries. The Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act ("IGRA") " ° provides a broad exemption
for Indian tribes. The Act distinguishes three classes
of games." Class I games involve tribal ceremonies
(III) in which the game is won by the first per-
son covering a previously designated arrangement
of numbers or designations on such cards, including
(if played in the same location) pull-tabs, lotto,
punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other
games similar to bingo, and
(ii) card games that-
(I) are explicitly authorized by the laws of the
State, or
(II) are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of
the State, and are played at any location in the
State, but only if such card games are played in
conformity with those laws and regulations (if any)
of the State regarding hours or periods of operation
of such card games or limitations on wagers or put
sizes in such card games.
(B) The term "class II gaming" does not include-
(i) any banking card games, including baccarat, chemin
de fer, or blackjack (21), or
(ii) electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any
game of chance or slot machines of any kind
(C) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this para-
graph, the term "class II gaming" includes those card
games played in the State of Michigan, the State of North
Dakota, the State of South Dakota, or the State of Wash-
ington, that are actually operated in such State by an in-
dian tribe on or before May 1, 1988, but only to the ex-
tent of the nature and scope of the card games that were
actually operated by an Indian tribe in such State on or
before such date, as determined by the Chairman.
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of this para-
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or celebration-type gaming; Class II games include
bingo and card games; Class III games consist of ca-
sino gambling, including slot machines. In order for
a tribe to engage in Class III gaming, it must enter
into a compact with the state in which it is located
and the compact must be approved by the Secretary
of the Interior. Section 2720 of the Act exempts any
gaming conducted by an Indian tribe from the adver-
tising ban imposed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301 and
1304. " 2 Section 2720's exemption for Indian gaming
has been incorporated into the FCC Rules, 1 8 as
were exemptions for state-conducted lotteries.
Interestingly, the question of whether the federal
provision allowing the broadcast advertising of In-
dian gaming preempts the laws of a non-gambling
state or a state that has no Indian gaming has not
been answered. In fact, to date, neither the FCC nor
the Indian Gaming Commission has issued an inter-
pretation on this potential conflict. The legislative
graph, the term "class II gaming" includes, during the 1-
year period beginning on October 17, 1988, any gaming
described in subparagraph (B)(ii) that was legally oper-
ated on Indian lands on or before May 1, 1988, if the
Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the lands on which
such gaming was operated requests the State, by no later
than the date that is 30 days after October 17, 1988, to
negotiate a Tribal-State compact under section 2710(d)(3)
of this title.
(E) Notwithstanding any other provision of this para-
graph, the term "class II gaming" includes, during the 1-
year period beginning December 17, 1991, any gaming
described in subparagraph (B)(ii) that was legally oper-
ated on Indian lands in the State of Wisconsin on or
before May 1, 1988, if the Indian tribe having jurisdiction
over the lands on which such gaming was operated re-
quested the State, by no later than November 16, 1988, to
negotiate a Tribal-State compact under section 2701(d)(3)
of this title.
(F) If, during the 1-year period described in subpara-
graph (E), there is a final judicial determination that the
gaming described in subparagraph (E) is not legal as a
matter of State law, then such gaming on such Indian
land shall cease to operate on the date next following the
date of such judicial decision.
(8) The term "class III gaming " means all forms of
gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming.
Id.
*11 25 U.S.C. § 2720 (1988) states, "[d]issemination of In-
formation: Consistent with the requirements of this chapter, sec-
tions 1301, 1302, 1303 and 1304 of Title 18 shall not apply to
any gaming conducted by an Indian tribe pursuant to this
chapter."
113 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211(c)(3) (1992).
For example, language contained in IGRA's Statement
of Policy provides:
It is a long-and well-established principle of Federal-In-
dian law as expressed in the United States Constitution,
reflected in Federal statutes, and articulated in decisions
history is silent on this issue, but suggests at one
point that the federal law preempts any conflicting
state laws.114 Further, the National Association of
Broadcasters appears to have interpreted the federal
provision as preempting conflicting state laws.11
The Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act
of 1988 ("Charity Games Act")' created additional
exceptions to the advertising ban. This Act allows
the broadcast advertising of charitable lotteries; 1 7
governmental lotteries; 8 and promotional lotteries
.conducted by commercial organizations where the
lottery is incidental and ancillary to the primary bus-
iness of the advertiser.1 9
The Charity Games Act expands the exemption
for state-conducted lotteries to permit broadcast ad-
vertising of any state lottery in any other state (re-
gardless of adjacency to the state advertising the lot-
tery) which conducts its own lottery 2' and
advertisements for betting on sporting events or con-
of the Supreme Court, that unless authorized by an act of
Congress, the jurisdiction of State governments and the
applications of state laws do not extend to Indian lands.
In modern times, even when Congress has enacted laws to
allow a limited application of State law on Indian lands,
the Congress has required the consent of tribal govern-
ments before State jurisdiction can be extended to tribal
lands.
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075, discussing Pub. L. No. 100-497
(1988); See also 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3076, in which the State-
ment of Policy provides: "S.555 is intended to expressly preempt
the field in the governance of gaming activities on Indian lands.
Consequently, Federal courts should not balance competing Fed-
eral, State and tribal interests to determine the extent to which
various gaming activities are allowed." Id. ,
1,5 See National Association of Broadcasters, Lotteries and
Contests, A Broadcasters Handbook, at 13 (3d ed. 1990), "[nlot
only is immediate (unless prohibited under state law) in-state
advertising of these games generally allowed, but cross-border
broadcasts (e.g., advertisements of Indian bingo conducted in one
State carried by stations in another) also now are allowed."
"' Act of Nov. 7, 1988, Pub L. No. 100-625, 102 Stat. 3205
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988)).
117 Id. Provision codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2)(A)
(1988).
116 Id. Provision codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2)(A)
(1988). Another exemption to the advertising ban, created in
1950, allows broadcast advertising of fishing contests. See Act of
Aug. 16, 1950, ch. 722, § 1, 64 Stat. 451, amending Title 18 to
add section 1305, which states, "[t]he provisions of this chapter
shall not apply with respect to any fishing contest not conducted
for profit wherein prizes are awarded for the specie, size, weight,
or quality of fish caught by contestants in any bona fide fishing
or recreational event." Id. See also 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3010 for
legislative history.
110 Id. Provision codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2)(B)
(1988).
120 18 U.S.C.A. § 1307(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993) states:
The provisions of sections 1301, 1302, 1303 and 1304
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tests.1 1 In addition, in 1988 Congress amended the
postal laws to provide that materials or advertise-
ments concerning lotteries, gift enterprises, or similar
activities can be mailed in any state so long as the
activity being advertised is legal in that state. 12 The
Act did not affect the existing ban on mailing lottery
paraphernalia or tickets in interstate commerce.128
Today it is legal to place advertisements for most
gambling and lotteries in newspapers, and to broad-
cast advertisements for state-sponsored lotteries,
charitable lotteries, and promotional lotteries inci-
dental to the regular operations of a business, so long
as the activities are permissible under the laws of the
state in which the broadcast station is licensed. " " In-
dian gaming that is permitted under IGRA can be
advertised over the broadcast medium.12 ' Informa-
tion can be mailed without fear of prosecution, pro-
shall not apply to ... (2) an advertisement, list of prizes,
or other information concerning a lottery, gift enterprise
or similar scheme, other than one described in paragraph
(1), that is authorized or not otherwise prohibited by the
State in which it is conducted and which is (A) conducted
by a not-for-profit organization or a governmental organi-
zation; or (B) conducted as a promotional activity by a
commercial ,organization and is clearly occasional and an-
cillary to the primary businesses of that organization.
Id.
121 18 U.S.C. § 1307(d) states:
For the purposes of subsection (b) of this section "lottery"
means the pooling of proceeds derived from the sale of
tickets or chances and allotting those proceeds derived
from the sale of tickets or chances and allotting those pro-
ceeds or parts thereof by chance to one or more chance
takers or ticket purchasers. "Lottery" does not include the
placing or accepting of bets or wager on sporting events or
contests. For purposes of this section, the term a "not-for-
profit organization" means any organization that would
qualify as tax exempt under section 501 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.
222 See 39 U.S.C. § 3005(d) (1988). The Amendment to Ti-
tle 39 conformed the mailing statutes to the amendments made
by the Act to Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
128 See 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4343. See also 102 Stat. 3205
(1988).
1" See 39 U.S.C. § 3005(d)(1988), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1307(a)(1988).
115 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2704, 2720 (1988).
116 See 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1988). See also supra note 122
and accompanying text.
127 These doubts, however, followed 50 years of experience
under the 1934 Act, in which FCC enforcement of the lottery
ban was aggressive and expansive. In a 1936 license renewal
hearing, the FCC adopted the traditional definition of a lottery,
In re WRBL Radio Station, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 687, 690-1 (1936),
and thereafter investigation and enforcement of prohibited
broadcasts became an agency staple. See, e.g., FCC SIXTH AN-
NUAL REPORT/FISCAL YEAR 57 (1940), in which the FCC re-
ported investigating 21 complaints involving "lottery programs."
The proliferation in the 1940s of radio giveaway shows, in
vided the lottery is lawful in the state from which
the information is mailed."2 ' Only broadcast adver-
tisements for non-exempt lotteries are still subject to
section 1304's ban.
III. CHALLENGES TO 18 U.S.C. § 1304
A. Early Doubts
As exemptions from the advertising ban multi-
plied, doubts as to the validity of the ban began to
arise. 2 ' In 1984, the FCC's General Counsel told
Congress that the amount of time the FCC devoted
to answering questions about the legality of broad-
casting certain kinds of advertisements that might be
considered lotteries seemed inordinate to the evil the
statues sought to contain.12 8 In 1987, then Chairman
which listeners at home could participate, prompted the FCC to
adopt an expansive definition of "consideration," designed to
prevent such programs, In re Promulgation of Rules Governing
Broadcast of Lottery Information, Report and Order, 43 F.C.C.
396 (1949). The Supreme Court struck down the rules as be-
yond the strict terms of the statute, FCC v. American Broadcast-
ing Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284 (1954). Perhaps spurred by the im-
pending advent of the modern state lottery, the FCC issued a
public notice in 1962 advising that the federal lottery statute
"makes no exception in favor of lotteries which may be legal
where conducted, as, for example, in the State of Nevada . .. ."
Broadcast of Lottery Information, Public Notice, 24 Rad. Reg.
(P & F) 478 (1962). The FCC's edict held fast, although certain
kinds of references to such lotteries were deemed not barred by
the statute, Broadcasting of Information Concerning Lotteries,
14 F.C.C.2d 707, para. 8 (1968), set aside and remanded, New
York State Broadcasters Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 414 F.2d
990 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970), on re-
mand, 21 F.C.C.2d 846 (1970); In re Notification to George P.
Mahoney, 45 F.C.C.2d 491 (1974). Generally, announcements
of places where lottery tickets can be purchased, where, how,
and when winning tickets were drawn, and the amounts of
prizes, continued to be prohibited. The Third Circuit reversed
an FCC determination that announcement of the winning lottery
number as part of a news broadcast would contravene the stat-
ute. New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United States, 491
F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), vacated as moot, 420 U.S.
371 (1975). State-conducted lotteries were subsequently ex-
empted from the lottery statute. See supra notes 96-98.
11" Letter from Bruce E. Fein, General Counsel, FCC, to
Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
contained in Modernizing Federal Restrictions on Gaming Ad-
vertising: Committee on the Judiciary Report, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6-7 (1984).
It is our view that permitting the advertising of lotteries
legal in the states in which they are conducted would not
unleash fraudulent schemes on the public. Rather, it
would fill the fund-raising and marketing needs of entities
that deem games involving prize, chance and consideration
to be effective tools for legitimate purposes. It will also




of the FCC, Dennis R. Patrick, testified before a
House subcommittee that:
The existing Section 1307 unnecessarily restricts the free
flow of information concerning legal activities (i.e., lotter-
ies permitted by a State). Accordingly, the existing law
may be constitutionally infirm given the increased recogni-
tion of First Amendment protection accorded commercial
speech since the lottery provision was originally
enacted.1 '9
The hypocrisy of the ban was denounced by a
member of the newspaper publishing industry in
1984. Roy J. Eaton, then a member of the National
Newspaper Association, testified that:
[L]egal lotteries can be and are advertised in carrier-deliv-
ered newspapers and flyers which do not cross State lines,
church bulletins, billboards and other like media. The re-
sults of the statute is [sic] thus to foster an increase in
lottery advertising in these advertising vehicles and [to] ar-
bitrarily discriminate against broadcasters . . .. o
Even the government agency responsible for pros-
ecuting violations of section 1304, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, expressed skepticism as to the con-
stitutionality of the ban. John C. Keeney, then
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division, testified that the Department had "serious
doubts [in light of Bigelow v. Virginia]'1 about the
ability of the Federal Government to enforce the
provisions of Chapter 61 of Title 18 as they apply to
advertisements of lotteries legal in the state in which
they are conducted." '182
B. Edge Broadcasting v. United States
The first direct challenge to section 1304 came in
Edge Broadcasting v. United States.8 8 Edge Broad-
Id.
129 Letter from Dennis R. Patrick, Chairman, FCC, to Hon.
Barney Frank, Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Law
and Government of the House Judiciary Committee (Nov. 3,
1987) (on file with CommLaw Conspectus) (emphasis added).
"" Advertising of Any State-Sponsored Lottery, Gift Enter-
prise or Similar Scheme: Hearings on H.R. Rep. No. 4020 and
H.R. Rep. No. 5097 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Law and Government Relations of the House Comm. on Judici-
ary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (June 14, 1984) (Testimony of
Roy J. Eaton, National Newspaper Association) [hereinafter
Subcommittee Hearings].
1 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
10 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 130, at 16-17 (testi-
mony of John Keeney, Dep. Asst. Atty. Gen'l. Crim. Div.). In
Bigelow, the Supreme Court held that Virginia exceeded its po-
lice powers when it barred truthful advertising for abortion ser-
vices in New York from being included in a newspaper pub-
casting was the licensee of Station WMYK-FM, a
station licensed to Elizabeth City, North Carolina,
which broadcast from a transmitter site only three
miles south of the border between Virginia and
North Carolina.1"" Approximately ninety-two per-
cent of WMYK's potential listening audience resided
in Virginia, and ninety-five percent of its advertising
revenues came from sources in Virginia. 85 Approxi-
mately eight percent of those within WMYK's ser-
vice area resided in North Carolina. 8 These poten-
tial listeners comprised less than two percent of the
population of North Carolina187
North Carolina did not sponsor a lottery and
made participation in the advertising of nonexempt
raffles and lotteries a criminal offense. 88 Because
North Carolina was a "non-lottery" state, the adver-
tising ban exemption set forth in section 1307 did
not apply.13 9 Consequently, Edge was barred from
airing advertisements for the Virginia lottery by sec-
tion 1304.1"0
Alleging that it had refrained from broadcasting
advertisement of the Virginia lottery out of fear of
criminal prosecution, and that it had consequently
lost millions in dollars in potential advertising reve-
nue, Edge sought a declaratory ruling that, as ap-
plied to the facts of the case, sections 1304 and 1307
violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. 1 The lower courts agreed and held
sections 1304 and 1307 unconstitutional.""
In a decision released June 25, 1993, the Supreme
Court reversed. The principal question considered
was whether the advertisement ban abridged the
First Amendment protection given to "'commercial
speech."1 "
In a series of cases culminating in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of
lished in Virginia Beach. 421 U.S. at 809.
M8 732 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1990).
184 Id. at 634.
18 Id. at 634-635.
116 Id. at 634.
187 Id.
138 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-219, 14-291 (1983).
139 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,
2701-02 (1993).
140 Id. at 2702.
141 Id.
141 The opinion was not published until after it had been
reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court found it "remarkable
and unusual" that a court of appeals would find it appropriate
not to publish a decision holding an Act of Congress unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 2702 n.3.
143 Id. at 2703.
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New York, 144 the Supreme Court had articulated
guidelines concerning "expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audi-
ence." 145 On the one hand, the Court found that
"commercial speech not only serves the economic in-
terest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and
furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of information. "146 On the other hand,
the Court recognized a "common sense distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction,
which occurs in an area traditionally subject to gov-
ernment regulation and other varieties of speech.
'1 47
To accord commercial speech its appropriate de-
gree of protection, the Court fashioned a four-part
analysis. The threshold criterion is (1) whether the
speech at issue is misleading or related to unlawful
activity. If the speech is not false or misleading, the
government's power is more circumscribed. A re-
striction on the speech in question would be upheld
only if (2) the government could assert a substantial
interest to be achieved; (3) the restriction directly ad-
vanced the interest asserted; and (4) the regulation is
not more extensive than necessary to serve the
interest. 148
In Edge, the Court quickly zeroed in on the sec-
ond and third criteria-the issue of whether the
challenged regulation directly advanced a substantial
governmental interest-and found that the courts be-
low "asked the wrong question. 1 49 The validity of
the restriction was to be judged "not by the extent to
which it furthers the Government's interest in an in-
dividual case," but by "the relation it bears to the
general problem of accommodating the policies of
both lottery and non-lottery states."150 Congressional
policy of "balancing the interests of lottery and non-
lottery States" was directly advanced by applying the
statutory restriction to all stations in North Carolina,
even if as applied to one station such as Edge's,
"there were only marginal advancement of that in-
terest." '151 Moreover, the Court found the restriction,
as applied to WMYK, was not ineffective. By keep-
ing lottery ads off WMYK, 127,000 people, eleven
percent of all radio listeners in the nine North Caro-
lina counties WMYK reached, were not exposed to
144 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
145 Id. at 561.
116 Id. at 561-562.
147. Id. at 562.
146 Id. at 566.
146 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,
2704 (1993).
160 Id. at 2705.
161 Id. at 2704.
lottery advertisements. This result gave more than
speculative or marginal support to North Carolina's
anti-gambling policy.152 The Court, therefore, up-
held the validity of section 1304 to the extent that it
prohibited a broadcast station in a non-lottery state
from airing ads for a lottery conducted by another
state.
C. Valley Broadcasting v. United States
The second challenge to section 1304 arose while
Edge was pending before the Supreme Court. Plain-
tiffs, Valley Broadcasting Company, licensee of Sta-
tion KVBC(TV), Las Vegas, and Sierra Broadcast-
ing Company, licensee of KRNV(TV), Reno, asked
the Nevada federal district court to find that unless
section 1304 and related FCC regulations were con-
strued so as to exclude casino gambling from the def-
inition of lottery, Nevada broadcast stations would
be unconstitutionally barred from airing truthful ad-
vertisements about activities which were lawful
under Nevada law.158
The argument that a distinction could be made be-
tween "lotteries" and other forms of "gaming" was
based on both semantic and historical grounds. Se-
mantically, plaintiffs argued that section 1304 liter-
ally applied only to a "lottery," "gift enterprise," or
"similar scheme," in which tickets were sold (or, in
the case of a gift enterprise, included in the purchase
price of merchandise or property) and winners were
selected by lot.'" Historically, plaintiffs argued, sec-
tion 1304 grew out of attempts to control state lotter-
ies. They noted that the Supreme Court had found
"the common forms of gambling are comparatively
innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-
spread pestilence of lotteries."15
The district court gave short shrift to the attempt
to place casino games outside the definition of "lot-
tery." Rather than parse semantic distinctions or
canvass the history of section 1304, the court merely
looked to precedent in which the Supreme Court had
defined a lottery as: (1) the distribution of prizes; (2)
according to chance; (3) for consideration.1" That
three-part definition was consistent with the defini-
12 Id. at 2706.
166 Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, appeal dock-
eted, No. 93-16191, Brief for Appellees at 19 (9th Cir. 1993)
[hereinafter Valley Brief].
16 Id. at 11 n.2 (citing FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.,
Inc., 347 U.S. 284 (1953)).
166 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 356 (1897) (citing
Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 163, 168, 12 L.Ed. 1030 (1850)).
"' FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 347 U.S. 284,
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tion contained in the FCC regulation.1 57 Casino
games clearly fell within such a definition, since they
are games of chance and involve the placing of bets
(consideration) in order to win a prize.
The definitional issue decided, the court moved on
to the issue of whether the ban on lottery advertise-
ments violated the First Amendment. The govern-
ment conceded that, to the extent the ads were pro-
tected as "commercial speech," the first prong of the
Central Hudson test was satisfied. " The advertise-
ments at issue related to a lawful activity and could
be assumed not to be misleading. " ' The First
Amendment analysis was thus narrowed to the issues
of whether the government had a substantial interest
in banning the'broadcast of ads for a lawful lottery
and whether there was a sufficiently tight "fit" be-
tween that interest and the speech restrictions
imposed. 6
The sharpest disagreement was over the nature of
the government's two interests. The government as-
serted: (1) an interest in protecting states that did not
authorize casino gambling; and (2) an interest in
retarding the growth of private gambling and
thereby preventing the spread of organized crime. 61
Plaintiffs responded that the issue of whether gam-
bling inevitably injured the health, safety and morals
of a community was an issue traditionally left to the
state, not the federal government, and that there was
no factual support for the assertion that legalized
gambling and organized crime were inevitably
linked 162 As the primary industry of Nevada, gam-
bling was highly regulated. Not only were the own-
ers of gaming operations rigorously scrutinized and
subject to state approval, but every key employee,
lender, and landlord, as well as non-gaming tenants
of every gaming establishment, was investigated by
and subject to the approval of State licensing
authorities."'
The district court rejected the government's for-
mulation of its interests on evidentiary grounds.16 4
The court found that the government had not offered
,any specific evidence to support its contention that
289-91 (1953).
187 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211(a) (1993).
18 Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 820 F. Supp.
519, 525 (D. Nev. 1993).
189 Id.
"I Id. at 525-26.
161 Id. at 525.
16 Id. at 525-26.
16 See NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 463.0129, 463.151-650; NEV.
GAM. COMM'N REGS. 1.55, 3.100, 3.110, 4.030, 5.070, 8.130,
15.530.1, 15.585.7-4, 25.020, 28.010-090 (Michie 1990).
1e4 820 F. Supp. at 525.
casinos licensed and heavily regulated by Nevada
were vehicles of organized crime; or that organized
crime was more attracted to private casino gaming
than to other forms of gaming for which advertise-
ments were permitted. Although legalized gambling
undoubtedly involved social costs, these costs were
not unique to casino gambling, but were common to
all forms of gambling, including state lotteries, In-
dian casinos, horse racing and charitable gaming."
Arguments regarding the third prong of the Cen-
tral Hudson test-whether the challenged restriction
"directly advanced" the governmental inter-
est-echoed arguments regarding the second prong.
The government contended that section 1304 directly
advanced its interest in protecting states which did
not authorize lottery activities. Although Station
KRNV(TV) was licensed to Reno, Nevada, nineteen
percent of those who received its signal were citizens
of California. Similarly, four percent of those, who
received the signal of Las Vegas Station KVBC(TV)
were Utah residents. 66 Neither Utah nor California
permitted casino advertising. 67 The government thus
contended that the advertising ban on the Nevada
stations was necessary to protect the citizens of ad-
joining "non-lottery" states. 6
Although the district court recognized that televi-
sion signals did not stop at state boundaries, it re-
jected the government's argument on two grounds.
First, the court found that the audience for the
plaintiff stations consisted "overwhelmingly of Ne-
vada residents," and that "an extremely small per-
centage of California and Utah residents" could re-
ceive the signals of KVBC(TV) and KRNV(TV).1"
The court found it difficult to accept that commer-
cials carried on Nevada stations posed any real dan-
ger to the public policies of California and Utah. In
addition, the court found that the advertising ban
only remotely advanced the government's federalism
interest, which the court defined as the duty to re-
spect the policies of all states regarding gambling.
Accordingly, the advertising ban did not pass muster
I d. at 526.
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, appeal dock-
eted, No. 93-16191, Brief for Appellants at 9-10, (9th Cir.
1993) [hereinafter Gov't Brief].
167 Id. at 9.
16 Id. at 19-21.
16 820 F. Supp. at 522. Citing the 1992 Statistical Abstract
of the United States, the court found that the population of Utah
was approximately 1,800,000, and that of California was
30,400,000. Approximately 13,200 Utah households received




under the third prong of the Central Hudson test.' °
For similar reasons, the court found that the cate-
gorical ban on lottery advertisements was not nar-
rowly drawn to serve the government's legitimate in-
terest in accommodating the lottery polices of
different states. A less restrictive alternative was
readily apparent, namely, a ban which would pro-
hibit casino ads only in those states that prohibited
casino gaming. Consequently, under the fourth
prong of Central Hudson, a categorical ban on lot-
tery advertisements was excessively restrictive, and
section 1304 was declared unconstitutional. 7 '
IV. THE VALLEY APPEAL
The Supreme Court's Edge decision upholding the
validity of section 1304 undoubtedly affected the fed-
eral government's decision to appeal the district
court's Valley decision in which section 1304 was
declared unconstitutional. Although the principal
question in both cases was the applicability of the
four-part analysis set forth in Central Hudson, the
district court's decision in Valley involves a number
of issues not encompassed by the Central Hudson
analysis.
One of these issues is the nature of commercial
speech itself. In its appeal of Valley, the government
seeks to diminish the effect of the ban imposed by
section 1304 by minimizing the protection to which
broadcast lottery ads are entitled. Such ads, the gov-
ernment maintains, constitute commercial speech in
its "purest form,"'7 2 and are merely a means
whereby advertisers could "reach the unreached and
persuade the unpersuaded.' 17 States that do not au-
thorize lotteries lack "the power to protect them-
selves and their citizens" from the solicitations of
broadcasts in states with more liberal lottery laws.1
74
Such a view of commercial speech is at odds with
the view of commercial speech adopted by the Su-
preme Court. 7 The Court has protected commer-
cial speech not only because it expresses the eco-
nomic interests of a commercial speaker, but because
it assists consumers and furthers the societal interest
in the fullest possible dissemination of informa-
170 Id.
171 Id.
1' Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 15.
173 Id. at 38.
17 Id. at 20.
178 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762-765 (1976); Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 377-378 (1977); Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New
tion. 17 This view was recently reiterated by the Su-
preme Court in a case involving advertising for ac-
counting services:
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our so-
cial and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and
information flourish. Some of the ideas and information
are vital, some of slight worth. But the general rule is that
the speaker and the audience not the government, assess
the value of the information presented. 1"
The starting point for an analysis of a restriction on
commercial speech is that the public has a right to
receive such speech rather than be "shielded" or "in-
sulated" from it.178 Even well-intentioned govern-
mental restrictions on speech are suspect because
they substitute the government's paternalistic assess-
ment of the information presented for that of the
speaker and the audience.
A second issue posed by Valley is whether a First
Amendment analysis of restrictions on commercial
speech can be circumvented altogether.1 7 9 The gov-
ernment maintains that the ban on lottery advertise-
ments would be justified even if section 1304 "did
not satisfy the general Central Hudson test."18 In
support of this proposition, the government cited the
Supreme Court's statement in Posadas de Puerto
Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. 8' that: "the Puerto Ri-
can Legislature surely could have prohibited casino
gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico altogether.
In our view, the greater power to completely ban ca-
sino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power
to completely ban advertising of casino gambling." 8 '
Relying upon this language, the government argued
that because Congress "could have outlawed all lot-
teries," it necessarily had the power to ban the
broadcast of advertisements for lotteries, even in
states which authorize lotteries. 8
Acceptance of such a sweeping rationale would
have far-reaching implications for the protection of
commercial speech. Commercial speech is, by its na-
ture, related to business activities which generally
are subject to federal regulation. The proposition ad-
vanced by the government would therefore essen-
tially strip commercial speech of First Amendment
protection and permit commercial speech to be regu-
York, 447 U.S. 557, 561-562 (1980).
176 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
117 Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993).
178 Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 32, 37, 40.
17I Id. at 41-42.
180 Id. at 42.
181 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
182 Id. at 345-46.
M Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 42.
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lated as completely as any form of interstate
commerce.
While many distinctions can be made between sec-
tion 1304 and the advertising restriction at issue in
Posadas,8'" the key distinction is that the Court in
Posadas considered an active legislative attempt to
protect Puerto Rican citizens from exposure to gam-
bling activities directed at tourists.' By contrast, in
Valley the federal government asserts a theoretical,
but unexercised power to ban advertisements for ac-
tivities which a state has determined to be beneficial
to its economy. The statement that the government
"could have" outlawed the lotteries affected by sec-
tion 1304, therefore, appears to be meaningless.
Having, in fact, deferred to the states to regulate lot-
teries, the federal government relies upon the exis-
tence of abstract legislative powers as a pretext for
avoiding the constitutional safeguards imposed on re-
strictions of protected speech.' 8'
The parties' sharply conflicting views of commer-
cial speech and the role of state authority shape and
shade their application of the Central Hudson crite-
ria. To the government, commercial speech is an in-
sidious and ominous force. It constantly threatens to
inundate or infect an unsuspecting public. The
moral force of federal power shields and protects the
population from this force. State power is at best ir-
relevant, and at worst, a thrall of "organized crime."
By contrast, the plaintiffs view commercial speech as
a benign or beneficial force, a means of informing
economic and recreational decisions. State regulatory
and police powers are regarded as pragmatically sen-
sitive to local and contemporary values, while federal
authority is draped in moralistic abstractions as out-
moded as the Victorian rhetoric in which they are
expressed.
These conflicting attitudes are nowhere more evi-
dent than in the application of the second prong of
the Central Hudson analysis, the definition of a sub-
stantial governmental interest. 87 The government
asserts that lotteries are a "pestilence" and that sec-
tion 1304 targets "the most dangerous and least so-
cially redeeming" form of lottery, casino gam-
'" For example, the ban in Posadas specifically targeted
only those ads for casino gambling which would most directly
affect Puerto Rican citizens. The statute did not ban all broad-
cast ads, all lottery ads, or all ads for casino gambling; nor did it
restrict advertisements for "horse racing, cock fighting, 'picas' or
small games of chance at fiestas" which were "part of the Puerto
Rican's roots." Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342.
169 Id. at 477.
' Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 23.
's' See supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.
1 Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 33.
bling;"'8 that the government's power to restrain the
"uniquely pernicious" social effects of lotteries re-
mains unchanged from the Victorian times;1"9 and
that the broad federal powers under the Commerce
Clause cannot be overridden by the "divergent as-
sessment" of a particular state. 90 While states such
as Nevada are free to legalize gambling within their
borders, they have no right to "trump" federal policy
with respect to the advertising of those lotteries by
means of interstate commerce.191
Among the difficulties posed by these arguments is
a definitional one. Although the government claims
that section 1304 targets only "casino gambling" and
''commercial lotteries," neither the statute nor the
implementing regulations make such a distinction.
As construed by the district court, the term "lottery"
applies broadly to any activity in which the three el-
ements of prize, chance, and consideration are pre-
sent.192 Such a definition makes no distinction be-
tween a simple drawing, a bingo game, or a
traditional casino game such as poker or roulette.
The terms of the statute do not, as the government
claims, draw "rational distinctions between different
kinds of gambling,"1 ' nor target particular types of
gambling. Advertisements for any type of casino
gambling are permitted, provided that the gambling
is conducted by an exempt class of promoter, e.g., a
state or Indian tribe.
1 94
To the government, historical changes in the regu-
lation of lotteries are irrelevant. The ban embodied
in section 1304 descends directly from Victorian pre-
cedent. Neither changing cultural attitudes, nor gut-
ting of federal lottery laws affects section 1304's
moral or legal authority. It does not matter that the
nineteenth century statutes prohibiting the advertis-
ing of lotteries by mail either have been eliminated
or have fallen into disuse;' 95 that a majority of states
now conduct and advertise lotteries; that the provi-
sions of section 1307 have been successively amended
to include an increasingly larger number of excep-
tions to the section 1304 advertising ban; or that the
sternly Victorian view of lotteries as a pernicious
pestilence has been overtaken by a more tolerant
189 Id. (citing Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)).
190 Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 23.
191 Id.
'9' Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 820 F. Supp.
519, 524 (D. Nev. 1993).
199 Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 33.
I" See 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988). See also 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1211(c) (1993).
1' Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988)).
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view of lotteries as a profitable form of entertain-
ment. The government scarcely acknowledges, far
from finding lotteries roundly condemned by state
governments, that the citizens of thirty-three states
and the District of Columbia are vigorously en-
couraged to engage in lotteries; that of the remaining
thirteen "non-lottery" states, at least five have re-
cently considered or are actively considering estab-
lishing a lottery; 96 that casino gambling is conducted
by Indian tribes in approximately thirty-three
states; '7 that eight states authorize casino gambling;
four states authorize riverboat gambling; that forty-
three states authorize pari-mutuel sports betting;1 8
and that only two states, Utah and Hawaii, prohibit
all forms of lotteries and pari-mutuel betting' 99
Given the federal government's de facto deferral to
the states on questions of gaming regulation, the in-
creasingly tolerant gaming policies of the states, and
the multiple exceptions to the once comprehensive
federal ban on lottery advertisements, there is good
reason to question the government's assertion that it
has, in any except a highly theoretical sense, a sub-
stantial interest in banning the broadcast of lottery
advertisements in a state where such lotteries are
authorized.
Although the government relies heavily on Edge to
undermine the arguments raised in Valley, there is a
real question as to whether the governmental interest
affirmed in Edge can be reconciled with the govern-
mental interest asserted in Valley. In Edge, the Su-
preme Court held that "[t]his congressional policy of
balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery
States is the substantial interest that satisfies Central
Hudson."' 00 The Court also stated that:
Instead of favoring either the lottery or non-lottery State,
Congress opted to support the antigambling policy of a
State like North Carolina by forbidding stations in such a
State from airing lottery advertising. At the same time it
sought not to unduly interfere with the policy of a lottery
sponsoring state such as Virginia. 1 '
In Valley, the government rejected all efforts to
"balance" the policies of differing states:
Congress never meant for section 1304 to adopt a position
1" See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct.
2696, 2711 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Ex. 7G, Val-
ley Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 820 F. Supp. 519 (D. Nev. 1993)
(CV-S-92-400-PMP(RJJ)). Exhibit 7, entitled "Gambling in
the United States," is based on a study conducted by the Nevada
State Gaming Control Board and was accepted as part of the
record in the Valley case.
198 Id. Ex. 7B:
of neutrality between states that prohibit casino gambling
and other commercial lotteries, on the one hand, and
states that encourage those forms of gambling, on the
other. Instead, Congress's goals were to reinforce the ef-
forts of anti-lottery states, and to minimize the social costs
associated with commercial lotteries by discouraging pub-
lic participation."0'
The government attacks the Valley decision on the
ground that, by applying section 1304 narrowly to
the plaintiff's circumstances, the court had embraced
the very analysis rejected by the Supreme Court in
Edge.'0 According to the government, the Valley de-
cision erroneously considered the question of
whether banning lottery advertisements on
KVBC(TV) and KRNV(TV) would directly ad-
vance the government's interest. The proper question
was not whether banning ads on these stations ad-
vanced a federal interest, but whether a universal
ban on ads for casino gambling on all broadcast sta-
tions was the "most effectual" means of protecting
"non-casino states and their residents."
20 4
The government's formulation of the question
shifts the focus from a factual inquiry into the actual
impact of lottery ads on citizens of California and
Utah to an abstract discussion of the federal govern-
ment's authority under the Commerce Clause. Ac-
cording to this formulation of the issue, Nevada's lot-
tery policies are "irrelevant."2 05 The only relevant
issue is one of the federal government's power: "[tihe
point is not that congress is 'right' and Nevada is
'wrong,' but simply that the constitution vests con-
gress, rather than Nevada, with the power to deter-
mine the interests to be pursued under the Com-
merce Clause."206
The issue of power also shapes the government's
analysis of the reasonableness of section 1304's re-
striction on speech: "[C]ongress was free to conclude
that the most effectual means of discouraging partici-
pation in casino gambling is to prohibit broadcast
advertising of the activity altogether. Any regulatory
scheme that permits broadcast advertising of casino
gambling, however limited, would necessarily com-
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lic demand." ' 7
In the government's view, the issue of the "fit" be-
tween a statutory goal and the resulting restriction
on speech is one to be answered in terms of effective-
ness. A categorical ban on broadcast ads is justified
because such a restriction is the "most effectual"
means of discouraging public participation in
lotteries.
The government's abstract assertions can be tested
with a concrete question: Why may Lady Luck, but
not Reno and Sparky, promote lotteries in a state
where lotteries are legal? The legal context in which
the issues were examined provides a partial explana-
tion. The Bonanza Casino ad was examined in the
context of a set of interpretive rules, which the FCC
has established by considering hundreds of lottery
advertisements. By contrast, the issues in Valley and
Edge arose out of a request for a declaratory ruling
as to the legality of section 1304. No specific ads
were at issue in either case. The issue presented was
purely one of whether section 1304 could be squared
with constitutional principles of law. This context
had a subtle but important effect on the tenor of both
cases. Would the government in Valley have so ring-
ingly proclaimed lotteries a pernicious pestilence if
confronted with tail-wagging mutts in a red Cadil-
lac, rather than "advertisements" in the abstract?
Could it have so confidently maintained that Reno
and Sparky-the father and son embodiment of
down-home family values-posed a pernicious threat
to the citizens of Utah or California? Would the
government have contended that viewers might resist
the frilly charms of Lady Luck, but still fall prey to
organized crime by joining Reno and Sparky down
at the Bonanza? The possibility of facing such ques-
tions at oral argument might have tempered the lan-
guage of the parties and focused attention on ques-
tions more amenable to analysis than such
hypothetical questions of whether the government
"could have" outlawed state-regulated lotteries
altogether.
These ridiculous questions contain a serious issue,
however: Do radio and television audiences make
any clear distinction between ads which use Lady
Luck to promote lotteries and ads which feature
Reno and Sparky for the same purpose? Supreme
Court precedent generally condemns "discrimination
among different users of the same medium for ex-
207 Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
208 Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92,
96 (1972).
209 Id. at 92-95.
210 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
pression."20 In one case, the Supreme Court consid-
ered an Illinois statute that banned pickets or dem-
onstrations within 150 feet of school buildings, but
exempted peaceful picketing of any school involved
in a labor dispute.2 9 In a subsequent case,210 the
Court considered a similar statute that barred all
residential picketing, but allowed peaceful pickets of
places of employment involved in labor disputes.
Both statutes were struck down on grounds that they
discriminated between lawful and unlawful conduct
based upon the content of the communication.
Although cloaked in "the guise of preserving resi-
dential privacy," the ban in the later case exempted
labor picketing on the grounds that it was just as
likely to intrude on the tranquility of the home.
21 1
The government defended the statute as an attempt
to "balance" the privacy rights of the homeowner
with the rights of employees to express their views,
but the Court found that such a balance included a
fatal presumption: "the desire to favor one form of
speech over all others.2' 2
Section 1304 is similarly flawed. Although the
government defends section 1304 as an attempt to
"strike a balance" between the promotion of certain
lotteries and the discouragement of public, participa-
tion in lotteries,2" such a balance contains the same
flaw identified in the picketing cases: it favors one
form of speech-lottery advertisements by a favored
class of advertisers-over all others. States, govern-
mental entities, Indian tribes, nonprofit organiza-
tions, and commercial entities that do not regularly
conduct lotteries may use the broadcast medium to
advertise their lotteries.2 1 4 Other advertisers may not.
For example, pursuant to the exceptions set forth
in section 1307, advertisements may be broadcast for
a casino game conducted under the auspices of a
North Dakota charity, but not for an identical game
lawfully conducted by a Las Vegas casino. Adver-
tisements may be broadcast for the use of slot ma-
chines lawfully operated by an Indian tribe, but not
for slot machines lawfully operated by a Nevada
casino.
The discrimination apparent in these two exam-
ples would be even more obvious if the charity or
Indian tribe contractually delegated the management
and operation of the gaming activity to a professional
gaming company.21 In such a case, section 1304
would permit or bar the broadcast of advertisements
211 Id. at 462.
212 Id. at 468.
218 Gov't Brief, supra note 166, at 6-7.
21 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211(c) (1993).
218 IGRA specifically provides for such contracts, see 25
19941
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
depending solely upon the legal form of the speaker.
Advertisements for the same game conducted by the
same operator might or might not be broadcast, de-
pending solely on such formal distinctions as the
public or private, tribal or corporate, for-profit or
not-for-profit status of the speaker.
In legal terms, these distinctions impose "a selec-
tive restriction on expressive conduct far 'greater
U.S.C. §§ 2711-2712.
216 Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 455
than is essential to the furtherance of [a substantial
governmental] interest.' "16 In practical terms, the
distinctions are simply incomprehensible. They can-
not be understood by the ordinary listener or viewer
who tunes in to a thirty second television ad.
Perhaps, after all, there is no good answer to the
question why Lady Luck may speak when Sparky
may not bark.
(1972).
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